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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Paul Shifflett was an inmate in the Pennsylvania prison 
system when he was set upon by fellow inmates who broke his 
jaw.  This was only the beginning of his troubles: the surgery 
on his jaw went badly, causing him intense pain for the better 
part of a year.  His efforts to seek treatment from the prison 
medical system bore only the most frustrating of fruit: he 
alleges he was denied adequate pain medication and given the 
run-around by different providers, each saying it was someone 
else’s responsibility.  Shifflett claims he had still not received 
fully adequate corrective surgery over eight months later when 
he filed this complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
naming seven prison officials and outside doctors as 
defendants and asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for deliberate indifference to severe medical need in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation 
of the First Amendment.   
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The District Court dismissed all of Shifflett’s claims, 
principally because it found he had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies within the prison system as required 
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e.  The Court also found the substance of 
Shifflett’s allegations insufficient and denied him leave to 
amend, concluding that amendment could not cure his failure 
to exhaust. 
We disagree.  In Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview 
SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153–55 (3d Cir. 2016), we strongly implied, 
though we did not hold outright, that a prisoner exhausts his 
administrative remedies as soon as the prison fails to respond 
to a properly submitted grievance in a timely fashion.  Today 
we finish what Robinson started and adopt this as a rule.  
Shifflett exhausted his remedies and acquired the right to come 
into federal court when the prison did not decide the initial 
appeal of his grievances within the time limits specified by the 
grievance policy.  Thus we reverse the District Court and 
remand with instructions to appoint counsel under Tabron v. 
Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), and to allow Shifflett to file 
an amended complaint with the assistance of counsel. 
I. Background 
The following facts are taken largely from the 
complaint, as well as certain attached documents.  They are 
lengthy, but necessary. 
Shifflett was an inmate at SCI Graterford in Skippack, 
Pennsylvania when he was attacked by fellow inmates on April 
6, 2016.  The attack broke his jaw, and the next day he was 
taken to Temple University Hospital for treatment.  On April 
8, Dr. Pamela Roehm—an ear, nose, and throat specialist at 
Temple—operated on Shifflett’s jaw, and he was placed on 
Norco (hydrocodone and acetaminophen) for ten days.  Two 
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weeks later he returned to Temple for a follow-up appointment 
with Dr. Roehm, during which she removed the stitches from 
the outside of his face and told him that those on the inside of 
his mouth would dissolve on their own.  Shifflett complained 
of intense pain in his jaw, but Dr. Roehm did not put him on 
any further pain medication.   
On May 4, 2016, Shifflett filed Grievance No. 625021 
through the prison grievance system (“Grievance No. 1”).  It 
asserted chiefly that he was not being treated for the pain in his 
jaw and that his numerous “sick call” request slips had been 
ignored.  It also stated that a contract doctor at SCI Graterford, 
Dr. Ferdinand Christian, had told him that there was no other 
option but to deal with the pain, and that Shifflett was receiving 
his medication only twice a day rather than three times a day 
as prescribed. 
Shifflett filed a second grievance against Dr. Christian, 
No. 626028, on May 11, 2016 (“Grievance No. 2”).  This one 
alleged that Shifflett had submitted several additional “sick 
call” request forms since his previous grievance, and that Dr. 
Christian eventually came to visit him on the 11th but said 
there was nothing he could do to help.  Eventually Dr. Christian 
agreed to send Shifflett to the hospital for another follow-up 
appointment, but he left before Shifflett could discuss his other 
medical concerns, which included his pain medication and his 
need for allergy medication.  The same day, Shifflett submitted 
a dental request form stating that he continued to be in extreme 
pain and requesting another examination of his jaw. 
The following day, Shifflett was taken back to the 
hospital for another appointment with Dr. Roehm.  In response 
to Shifflett’s statement that he was in excruciating pain, that 
there was swelling in his face, and that his teeth felt misaligned, 
Dr. Roehm increased his dose of Motrin (ibuprofen). 
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On May 24, 2016, Shifflett saw Dr. Muhammad 
Golsorkhi, a medical doctor at SCI Graterford.  He requested 
an increase in his pain medicine, which Dr. Golsorkhi refused 
because a higher dose of Motrin could cause long-term harm.  
Shifflett asked for a stronger pain medicine instead, but was 
refused.  Dr. Golsorkhi suggested that Shifflett speak to 
“dental” about his concerns, and the following day he did just 
that, submitting a dental sick call request.   
Dr. Ronald J. Burkholder, a contract dentist at SCI 
Graterford, saw Shifflett on May 26 and took an x-ray of his 
jaw.  Dr. Burkholder opined that Shifflett’s pain was the result 
of a incorrectly performed surgery and that Dr. Roehm should 
have inserted plates on both sides of Shifflett’s jaw rather than 
two plates on the left side, and should have removed a wisdom 
tooth on the left side of his mouth before inserting the plates.  
Shifflett asked Dr. Burkholder for pain medication but was told 
that the issue was medical rather than dental in nature. 
Later that same day, Shifflett submitted Grievance No. 
628368 (“Grievance No. 3”).  It recounted his meeting with Dr. 
Burkholder and noted that the medical and dental professionals 
at SCI Graterford had each disclaimed responsibility for his 
treatment, saying his problems were in the other’s area of 
practice.  Thus he requested to be seen by an external doctor 
but not at Temple University Hospital.  He also reiterated his 
complaints of continued pain and sick call requests being 
ignored. 
On May 27, 2016, the Corrections Health Care 
Administrator at SCI Graterford, Joseph C. Korszniak, issued 
the Initial Review Responses to Grievance Nos. 1 and 2.  
Korszniak stated that Shifflett was not being neglected, as he 
had been prescribed medication for his condition; that some 
delays in the delivery of medication were beyond the nursing 
staff’s control; that “[p]ain is very difficult to treat since most 
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individual[s] perceive pain differently[, as s]ome have a very 
high tolerance and some have a low or no tolerance;” and that 
pain management was in the discretion of the health care 
providers.  He did, however, state that he would schedule 
Shifflett to visit the pain management clinic. 
Over the following days Shifflett submitted further sick 
call requests, one “medical” on May 29 and one “dental” on 
the 30th.  Those requests complained of continuing severe pain 
as well as bleeding in his mouth, and sought increased pain 
medication and re-examination of his mouth.  On May 30 
Shifflett also submitted Grievance No. 628417 (“Grievance 
No. 4”), which reiterated many of his prior complaints and 
added a few new details, notably that Drs. Christian and 
Golsorkhi would not give him adequate pain medication 
because he was “in the hole” [i.e., in solitary confinement] and 
therefore did not deserve proper treatment.  That same day he 
was seen again by Dr. Christian, who refused to treat him.  The 
next day a prison guard told Shifflett that he had a pass to see 
a dentist but was not taken to his appointment.  On June 1, 
2016, Grievance Nos. 3 and 4 were rejected as duplicative of 
Grievance No. 1.  On June 2, 2016, Shifflett was again 
informed by a guard that he had a pass to see a dentist, and 
again he was not taken to the appointment. 
On June 7, Shifflett filed a staff request complaining 
that the responses to Grievance Nos. 1 and 2 were overdue.  
Korszniak’s responses to these grievances had been signed on 
May 27 and were marked “RECEIVED” on May 30, but it 
appears that Shifflett had not yet received a copy of either.  The 
next day he submitted another dental request form, noting that 
he was developing an infection in his mouth, and he appealed 
the denial of Grievance Nos. 3 and No. 4, which he noted did 
not concern the same subject matter as Grievance No. 1.  It 
does not appear that there was any response to these appeals. 
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On June 12, 2016, Shifflett filed appeals of the denial of 
Grievance Nos. 1 and No. 2.  He also submitted a request for a 
peer review of his treatment and for a “dental hold,” both under 
the terms of the prison’s policies.  In the following days he 
again submitted sick call requests to both dental and medical.  
On June 16, he was seen by Dr. Michael J. Bianco, a contract 
dentist at SCI Graterford, who placed Shifflett on a soft diet 
and prescribed penicillin to deal with his infection.  Dr. Bianco 
reviewed Shifflett’s x-ray from May 26, concluding that there 
were hairline fractures in Shifflett’s jaw and that screws might 
have been drilled into his wisdom tooth.  He also ordered a CT 
scan and arranged for Shifflett to see a Dr. Samee, an oral 
specialist from Temple University Hospital, on June 22, which 
never took place.  (The complaint does not state Dr. Samee’s 
full name.) 
Shifflett was transferred to SCI Mahanoy on June 21.  
This transfer is what his request for a dental hold had been 
intended to prevent, as he had upcoming follow-up 
appointments at Temple University Hospital.  On June 27, 
Shifflett had an appointment at Geisinger Hospital for a CT 
scan.  Three days later, he was seen by a Dr. Kaz, evidently on 
the medical staff at SCI Mahanoy (we again do not have a full 
name), who ordered that he see an oral specialist in late July, 
renewed his order of Motrin, and prescribed amoxicillin.  
Shifflett was seen again by Dr. Kaz on July 7, when he renewed 
both of Shifflett’s medications, stated that he believed 
Shifflett’s initial surgery would need to be corrected, and stated 
that he would continue seeing Shifflett—and treating the 
infection in his mouth—until he could see a specialist.  Shifflett 
had further appointments with Dr. Kaz on July 14 and 19, and 
was told he would see a specialist on July 28.  
Meanwhile, on July 27 the Facility Manager at SCI 
Graterford, Cynthia Link, issued an appeal response as to 
Grievance Nos. 1 and No. 2.  Link upheld the denial of the 
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grievances, noting that she was not qualified to dictate or 
overrule the decisions of trained medical professionals and 
recommending that Shifflett continue working with the 
medical staff to treat his symptoms.  The responses 
acknowledged that they were late (under prison policy a 
response to Shifflett’s appeal was due within 15 working days, 
i.e., on July 1—almost a month before the actual response) but 
stated that this would not affect his appeal rights. 
On July 28, Shifflett saw Dr. Joseph P. Mulligan, a 
dentist from Temple University Hospital.  Dr. Mulligan 
declined to opine on Shifflett’s various medical problems, 
stating that doing so would make him an expert witness in any 
future legal proceedings and that Shifflett could not afford him.  
Instead he renewed the Motrin order, prescribed clindamycin, 
and reiterated that Shifflett would need corrective surgery.  The 
following day Shifflett met with the Corrections Health Care 
Administrator for SCI Mahanoy, John Steinhart, who told him 
that he was being transferred back to SCI Graterford for an 
appointment at Temple University Hospital.  Shifflett replied 
that he did not want to go back to that hospital, but Steinhart 
stated that Temple would “have to correct its mistake.”  (In fact 
Shifflett was transferred to SCI Chester, not SCI Graterford.) 
Shifflett was again seen by Dr. Roehm at Temple 
University Hospital on August 3.  He argued with Dr. Roehm 
over her intent to take a CT scan, as she seemingly was 
unaware of his CT scan from June 27.  Shifflett took issue with 
Dr. Roehm’s assumption that the hardware in his mouth—
which Dr. Roehm planned to remove—was the cause of his 
pain.  She said she would schedule an appointment for a CT 
scan and perform the surgery thereafter.  Shifflett was taken 
back to SCI Chester and continued to receive clindamycin. 
Eventually, after another month of submitting numerous 
sick call requests and seeing various prison doctors, Shifflett 
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was taken back to Temple University Hospital for his surgery 
on September 6, 2016.  One of the two plates in his mouth was 
removed, and he was told that the other had not been removed 
because the plate and screws were hitting his wisdom tooth, 
which was causing complications.  His discharge from the 
hospital was somewhat rushed, such that he had trouble 
urinating upon his return to SCI Chester.  Two days later he 
was released from the infirmary, but his face was “swollen as 
if he had a grapefruit in his mouth.”  He received no treatment 
for this swelling or for his continued pain.   
Shifflett returned to Dr. Roehm on September 14, and 
was told he would see an oral specialist to remove his wisdom 
teeth.  Shifflett saw Dr. Samee on September 27, and was 
informed that one wisdom tooth needed to be removed but that 
Dr. Samee could not perform the surgery yet due to the sorry 
state of Shifflett’s jaw after his recent surgery.   
That same day he finally received a copy of the 
responses to his grievance appeals for Nos. 1 and 2.  On 
October 12—15 days after he received a copy of the appeal 
responses—Shifflett submitted a second set of appeals to the 
Chief Secretary of Inmate Grievance and Appeals.  They were 
rejected on October 20 using a form that checked off two 
reasons for the rejection: the appeals were not submitted within 
15 days after the decisions being appealed and Shifflett had not 
attached all of the required documentation to his appeals.  He 
had several more appointments with various doctors 
throughout November 2016, but still did not receive the 
surgery to remove his wisdom teeth as of December 15, 2016. 
Shifflett filed this complaint in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on December 19, 2016.  He 
named Dr. Bianco, Dr. Burkholder, Dr. Christian, Dr. 
Golsorkhi, Korszniak, Dr. Roehm, and Dr. Mulligan as 
defendants and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
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violations of the Eighth Amendment (deliberate indifference to 
severe medical need) and First Amendment (retaliation for 
engaging in protected expression by filing complaints).  
Defendants Bianco, Burkholder, and Korszniak (referred to as 
the “Corrections Defendants”) filed one motion to dismiss on 
March 8, 2017.  Dr. Mulligan filed a separate motion to dismiss 
on March 21, followed by a motion from Dr. Roehm on March 
22 and one from Dr. Golsorkhi on March 28.  The Corrections 
Defendants filed certificates of concurrence as to the other 
defendants’ motions to dismiss.  (It does not appear that 
Christian was ever served, and he did not participate in the 
litigation.) 
For the most part, these motions to dismiss asserted that 
Shifflett had not alleged any deliberate indifference to his 
severe medical needs adequate to create liability under the 
Eighth Amendment.  Some made other contentions—for 
instance, the Corrections Defendants made some arguments 
specific to Korszniak, whose supervisory role placed him in a 
different position, and Dr. Mulligan argued that the complaint 
did not describe any First Amendment retaliation on his part.  
Only Dr. Golsorkhi’s motion made any mention of 
administrative exhaustion.  He alleged that Shifflett failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA 
because his secondary appeals of Grievance Nos. 1 and 2 were 
not filed within 15 days after the Facility Manager’s decision 
on July 27, 2016.  Dr. Golsorkhi had also subpoenaed the entire 
case file for these grievances, which to him demonstrated that 
the appeals were rejected not only as untimely but because he 
failed to attach the full grievance record.  Failure to comply 
with the grievance appeal procedures thus meant that Shifflett 
had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies.   
The District Court granted all of the motions to dismiss, 
both because Shifflett failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies and because he had not stated a valid merits claim.  
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See Shifflett v. Korszniak, 2017 WL 2986331 (E.D. Pa. 2017).  
The opinion noted that in their motions to dismiss “Moving 
Defendants argue several grounds for dismissal,” including 
failure to exhaust, but it did not address that only one of the 
motions to dismiss had actually mentioned exhaustion.  Id. at 
*5.   
The Court’s analysis began by noting that Shifflett’s last 
appeal was dismissed as procedurally defective.  Then, in a 
footnote, it considered and rejected his arguments why this 
should not foreclose his suit.  As to Shifflett’s point that the 
prison failed to follow its own policies when it did not decide 
his first appeals in a timely fashion, the Court observed that the 
response to those appeals stated that the delay would not affect 
his appellate rights.  And although Shifflett noted that he filed 
his secondary appeals within 15 days of the date when he first 
received notice of the decision on the first appeals, the Court 
observed that the language of the prison policy required him to 
submit his final appeal within 15 days of the date of the 
decision itself, not from when he received a copy of it.  The 
opinion concluded that “[Shifflett’s] claims against Moving 
Defendants are barred for failure to exhaust all administrative 
remedies and, therefore, are dismissed.”  Id. at *6.   
The Court went on to consider the merits of the 
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.  It held that Shifflett had 
alleged at most negligence or malpractice but not deliberate 
indifference as required under the Eighth Amendment, as “it is 
undisputed[] that medical decisions were made and treatment 
provided to [Shifflett], which necessarily indicates that 
Defendant Doctors did not consciously disregard a risk to [his] 
health.”  Id. at *7.  As to the First Amendment claim, the Court 
observed that Shifflett had not alleged any personal 
involvement by any of the defendants in the decision to transfer 
him.  It rejected his argument that Korszniak retaliated against 
him by failing to place a medical hold on the transfer, as 
14 
 
Shifflett had requested.  Id. at *9.  Finally, the Court denied 
Shifflett leave to amend, noting that this would be futile 
because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
and was therefore barred from suit by the PLRA.   Id. at *10. 
Shifflett filed a timely notice of appeal that mentioned 
five of the defendants but not Dr. Mulligan.1   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review anew the District Court’s grant of a motion 
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as 
well as its interpretation of the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 
2004).  We review the decision to deny leave to amend for 
abuse of discretion.  Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 
324–25 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. Analysis 
A. Exhaustion 
The principal issue before us is whether Shifflett 
exhausted his administrative remedies.  The PLRA states that 
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under [§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  
                                              
1 On appeal, Shifflett was represented pro bono by students in 
Yale Law School’s Appellate Litigation Project, supervised by 
lawyers from Wiggin & Dana.  We thank them for their able 
and zealous work representing Shifflett. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  Exhaustion is considered separately for 
each claim brought by an inmate, and if a complaint includes 
both exhausted and unexhausted claims, courts will dismiss the 
latter but not the former.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219–
20 (2007).  The Supreme Court has held that the PLRA requires 
what is known as “proper exhaustion,” meaning that inmates 
must comply with the rules and procedures of prison 
administrative systems.  See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 
90–91 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with 
an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules 
because no adjudicative system can function effectively 
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its 
proceedings.”).  We have held that these procedural 
requirements are drawn from the policies of the prison in 
question rather than from any free-standing federal law.  
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231.  Thus we look to the grievance policy 
at SCI Graterford to determine whether Shifflett has properly 
exhausted his remedies as required by the PLRA.  See Inmate 
Grievance System—DC-ADM 804, Pa. Dep’t. of Corr. (May 1, 
2015) (“DC-ADM 804”), available at 
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20P
olicies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf. 
Of course, exhaustion applies only when administrative 
remedies are “available.”  Under certain circumstances, a 
nominally extant prison grievance policy is not truly an 
“available” remedy.  Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016).  
This applies when the procedure “operates as a simple dead 
end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide 
any relief to aggrieved inmates,” where it is “so opaque that it 
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” or “when 
prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of 
a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, 
or intimidation.”  Id. at 1859–60.   
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Shifflett argues that his administrative appeals were 
rendered unavailable when the prison failed to respond in a 
timely manner to his first appeal of Grievance Nos. 1 and 2.  
For this claim he relies on Robinson v. Superintendent 
Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2016).  There, a prisoner 
submitted a grievance and received no response within the 
period prescribed by the grievance policy.  Id. at 151.  He filed 
an action in federal court roughly three months after a response 
was due from the prison, and only another six weeks thereafter 
received a response to his initial grievance.  Id. at 152.  We 
noted that “[f]ive of our sister courts have held that a prison’s 
failure to timely respond to an inmate’s properly filed 
grievance renders its remedies ‘unavailable’ under the PLRA,” 
id. at 153, and quoted approvingly language from the Fifth 
Circuit stating that “[a] prisoner’s administrative remedies are 
deemed exhausted when a valid grievance has been filed and 
the state’s time for responding thereto has expired.”  Id. 
(quoting Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam)).  We then held that, 
[c]onsistent with Small [v. Camden Co., 728 F.3d 
265 (3d Cir. 2013)] and the unanimous view of 
the Courts of Appeals that have spoken on the 
matter, . . . SCI Rockview rendered its 
administrative remedies unavailable to 
[Robinson] when it failed to timely (by its own 
procedural rules) respond to his grievance and 
then repeatedly ignored his follow-up requests 
for a decision on his claim.   
Id. at 154.   
Dr. Golsorkhi seeks to distinguish Robinson, arguing 
that it concerned extreme facts not present in this case.  It is 
true that our holding there, strictly viewed, rested in part on 
those facts, and therefore Robinson itself did not establish a 
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bright-line rule.  Its discussion of the relevant legal principles 
left little doubt, however, that our Court considers such a rule 
appropriate.  The PLRA requires that prisoners comply with 
the procedural demands of a system created by their jailors.  No 
less must prisons comply with the demands of the system they 
created.  Hence we hold that as soon as a prison fails to respond 
to a properly submitted grievance or appeal within the time 
limits prescribed by its own policies, it has made its 
administrative remedies unavailable and the prisoner has fully 
discharged the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. 
Applying this rule to Shifflett’s case, and taking the 
allegations in his complaint as true, it is clear that he exhausted 
his remedies as to the matters addressed in Grievance Nos. 1 
and 2 on July 1, 2016.  The prison grievance policy requires 
the Facility Manager to respond to appeals within 15 working 
days after they are filed (here, July 1).  See DC-ADM 804, 
§ 2.A.2.d(1) (“The Facility Manager/designee shall notify the 
inmate . . . of his/her decision within 15 working days of 
receiving the appeal.”).  Shifflett filed his appeals on June 12, 
and received no response within the specified time limit.  At 
that moment he obtained the right to come into federal court.  
We need not consider the contention, urged by Dr. Golsorkhi 
and adopted by the District Court, that Shifflett was required 
under the policy to file his secondary appeal prior to the 
moment when he actually received a copy of the Facility 
Manager’s decision on his first appeal.  Nor does it matter 
whether Shifflett failed to attach the proper documents to his 
secondary appeal.  His decision to continue working through 
the prison’s internal system in good faith did not waive or 
negate his successful exhaustion of remedies as required by the 
PLRA.2  
                                              
2 Although the District Court did not mention Grievance Nos. 
3 and 4 in its opinion, it appears from the record before us that 
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This does not apply, however, to Shifflett’s First 
Amendment retaliation claim, which was not the subject of any 
grievance he submitted.  Retaliation is a separate claim, see 
White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1990), and 
therefore must be separately grieved.  And although in rare 
cases prisoners will not be required to file a grievance for a 
retaliation claim if they fear further retaliation, see Rinaldi v. 
United States, 904 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir. 2018), that is not the 
case here.  Shifflett does not specifically allege that he feared 
further retaliation, and the extreme facts of Rinaldi—overt 
threats of violent retribution—are not present here.  Moreover, 
Shifflett continued to litigate his various disputes with the 
prison system after the transfer he claims was retaliatory.  This 
weighs heavily against the notion that the fear of further 
reprisal deterred him from submitting a grievance for his 
retaliation claim.  Thus, although we reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of Shifflett’s Eighth Amendment claims as 
unexhausted, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice of his First 
Amendment claim.  
B. Leave to Amend 
Because we conclude the District Court should not have 
dismissed Shifflett’s Eighth Amendment claims for failure to 
exhaust, we vacate as well its refusal to allow leave to amend 
as to those claims.  As noted, the only stated basis for that 
refusal was the impossibility of curing the exhaustion defect 
through re-pleading.  On appeal the Corrections Defendants, as 
well as Dr. Roehm, argue that amendment would be futile for 
substantive reasons.  They suggest that the allegations in 
Shifflett’s complaint make clear that no constitutional 
violations occurred.  Thus, even if we were to reverse the 
                                              
the prison never responded to Shifflett’s initial appeals of these 
grievances.  Both of these grievances should be addressed by 
the District Court on remand. 
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District Court on exhaustion, they would ask us to review the 
substance of Shifflett’s allegations and, finding them lacking, 
affirm the dismissal with prejudice. 
This is not convincing.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(a)(2) states that the Court “should freely give leave [to 
amend] when justice so requires.”  This certainly includes 
amendment to cure defective allegations.  See 6 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1474 (3d ed. 
2019) (“A . . . common use of Rule 15(a) amendments is to 
correct insufficiently stated claims or defenses.  Typically, 
amendments of this character involve either adding a necessary 
allegation in order to state a claim for relief or correcting a 
misnomer of a party to the action.”).  Thus even if defendants 
are correct that the facts alleged in the initial complaint do not 
describe any Eighth Amendment violations, Shifflett is free to 
add by amendment new allegations or to alter some of his 
existing allegations. 
C. Remand 
Having vacated the dismissal with prejudice of 
Shifflett’s Eighth Amendment claims, we remand to the 
District Court to allow Shifflett to file an amended complaint 
and to appoint counsel for him.  Under Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 
147 (3d Cir. 1993), counsel should be appointed where an 
indigent plaintiff with a potentially meritorious claim is not 
fully able to prosecute his or her own case in light of the overall 
complexity of the case.  See id. at 155–56.  Of particular note, 
this case involves numerous different defendants, each subject 
to different allegations, and may well require medical expert 
testimony to establish deliberate indifference at trial.  See id. at 
156 (noting the complexity of legal issues and the need for 
expert testimony as two key factors favoring appointment of 
counsel).   
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Though we do not rule on the merits of the existing 
complaint, we do offer comment on the legal standards we 
believe relevant on remand.  First, administrative exhaustion is 
not a pleading requirement but rather an affirmative defense.  
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).  Moreover, it appears 
that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement would not apply to 
any amended complaint Shifflett might file at this point 
because he is no longer incarcerated.  See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 
297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement does not apply to suits brought by former 
prisoners concerning their conditions of confinement while 
incarcerated); see also id. at 210 n.10 (citing Harris v. Garner, 
216 F.3d 970, 979–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (suggesting 
that, where a prisoner’s suit is brought during his incarceration 
but he is subsequently released, any dismissal for failure to 
exhaust should be without prejudice to refiling)).   
Second, that some treatment has been provided does not 
automatically defeat an Eighth Amendment deliberate-
indifference claim.  The failure to provide adequate treatment 
can also amount to deliberate indifference.  See Rouse v. 
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197–98 (3d Cir. 1999) (prison officials 
act with deliberate indifference when they, among other things, 
“persist[] in a particular course of treatment in the face of 
resultant pain and risk of permanent injury”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
This is not to say that Shifflett’s deliberate indifference 
claims are adequate as they stand.  Nor do we prejudge whether 
on remand the eventual amended complaint will adequately 
state a valid claim or claims.  That determination will be made 
in the first instance by the District Court.  We seek only to 
clarify principles that relate to that endeavor. 
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IV. Conclusion 
What is good for the goose is good for the gander.  The 
PLRA requires strict compliance by prisoners seeking redress 
of their grievances, and by the same token we hold that it 
requires strict compliance by prison officials with their own 
policies.  Whenever a prison fails to abide by those procedural 
rules, its administrative remedies have become unavailable, 
and inmates are deemed to have successfully exhausted their 
remedies for purposes of the PLRA.  In this case, according to 
the complaint, Shifflett met that standard when the Facility 
Manager at SCI Graterford did not respond to his first appeals 
within the specified 15 days.  Thus we affirm in part (as to 
Shifflett’s First Amendment claims) and reverse in part (as to 
his Eighth Amendment claims), and remand for the District 
Court to allow Shifflett to file an amended complaint and to 
appoint counsel for him under Tabron.3  
                                              
3 Relying on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, Dr. 
Mulligan argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction over him 
because Shifflett’s notice of appeal failed to name him and 
failed to “refer specifically to the Order on [Dr. Mulligan’s] 
Motion to Dismiss as being one of the orders that [Shifflett] is 
appealing.”  Mulligan Br. 17.  We disagree.  Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3 does not require that appellees be named 
in the notice of appeal; the rule only requires that the notice of 
appeal name the appellants.  Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A) (“The 
notice of appeal must . . .specify the party or parties taking the 
appeal . . . .”).  Regarding the order identified in the notice of 
appeal, the District Court issued only one order granting all of 
the motions to dismiss.  As such, by identifying that single 
order, we conclude that Shifflett complied with the 
requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) 
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to “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being 
appealed” in the notice of appeal. 
 
